



















SO: Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 




SO: This is Dr Sue Onslow talking to Mr Surendra Nihal Singh at Senate 
House on Tuesday 21st May 2013. Mr Singh, thank you very much indeed 
for coming in to talk to me. I wondered if you could begin by saying, 
please; how did you come to be a political journalist? 
 
SNS: Well, I suppose it was natural progression because in India at least on the 
major newspapers you start as a local reporter, court, police, that kind of 
thing, local meetings; and then after a certain stage you graduate to 
parliamentary reporting, political reporting and so on. So, it’s a question of 
going up the ladder professionally. 
 
SO: During your time as a journalist, was there quite a narrow circle of 
Indian political reportage, or was this a pretty large and competitive 
field? 
 
SNS: Well, not as competitive as it is today of course and I’m talking of the early 
1950s. There were a few recognised political reporters or correspondents and 
they ruled the roost, unlike today when there is a plethora of political reporting 
and commentaries and so on. 
 
SO: What sort of access did you have to Indian politicians at that particular 
point in the ‘50s; was this quite a small world? 
 
SNS: Pretty good because in those days The Statesman was one of the best 
newspapers in the country. I had a pretty good access to everybody I wanted 
to see, from the Prime Minister to Cabinet Ministers and others, so there was 
no problem in getting access to them. 
 
SO: In the 1950s then what was your particular view of the place of the 
Commonwealth in Indian foreign policy and Indian diplomacy? 
 
SNS: Well, I think after the Nehru era, shall we say, the importance of the 
Commonwealth was rather limited, I think, from the Indian perspective. I was 
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quite amused that when I was looking through a Google search on the 
Commonwealth that there have been certain very acerbic comments on the 
Commonwealth from various quarters, including Tony Blair and of course 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan who was out of the Commonwealth for a time. 
He called it ‘an anachronistic old boys club’ and Blair, I recall, said that it was 
‘Like fox hunting, it belongs to another era.’ 
 
I think you will have to divide it between the Nehru phase and the post Nehru 
phase. I think that Nehru himself, because of his upbringing and education 
and attachment to British values, had a particular place for the 
Commonwealth and he believed that it was a useful institution; but as far as I 
can recall, I think after him the importance of the Commonwealth in Indian 
policy making establishments diminished. Of course, then you came to the 
point of Britain joining the European Economic Community, which meant 
really that apart from the economic aspect of it that Britain felt, despite its 
links to the colonies or ex-colonies, that it was time to get to where it 
belonged, which is Europe. 
 
SO: Sir, just going back to the earlier period of India and the 
Commonwealth: how small was this Indian foreign policy making 
establishment in Nehru’s time in office? The Commonwealth itself was a 
very much smaller club at this particular point. 
 
SNS: Yes, of course. 
 
SO: This was the old Commonwealth and India from 1949. But by the 
beginning of the ‘60s, the Commonwealth was changing in shape and 
form and membership dramatically. So, your point about Nehru’s 
demise and the declining importance in the Commonwealth in foreign 
policy making circles corresponds to the era in which the 
Commonwealth was expanding. 
 
SNS: Yes, and for the new members or newer members of the Commonwealth, the 
Commonwealth was an important institution because it gave them a certain 
amount of prestige and the fact that they could rub shoulders with the high 
and mighty of the Commonwealth which would have been difficult otherwise.  
So, I think it is a much more useful institution for the newer members 
especially from Africa, and at a later stage I thought for the island nations in 
particular, the small countries. A lot of members of the Commonwealth are 
quite small; we tend to forget that. They found it useful in terms of pushing for 
climate change and the threat to their countries basically. 
 
SO: In the Indian political system which, after all, is modelled to a degree on 
the Westminster system, where does foreign policy making sit in terms 
of decision making and critical input? 
 
SNS: In the Prime Minister’s Office. Because the President is a figurehead in many 
ways. 
 
SO: So the locus of decision making is very much in the Prime Minister’s 
Office. The Prime Minister’s advisers then are of critical importance. 
 
SNS: Well, there again you have to distinguish between the Nehru and post Nehru 
phases because in Nehru’s time and the Indian defeat at the hands of 
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Chinese in the 1962 border war. Until that time Nehru was everything in 
foreign policy; he was the fountainhead of policy and even people who had 
reservations dared not challenge him because he was the supreme person.  
Well, that changed dramatically after the border war and he never really 
recovered from that defeat psychologically and physically, then of course he 
died not too long afterwards. So, you had a concentration of foreign policy 
making in Nehru’s office, in the Prime Minister’s Office and with Nehru, with 
the officials amplifying things up to a point or putting the flesh on his ideas. 
 
So, it was very much a single man kind of concept of foreign policy, which of 
course he elaborated the philosophical underpinnings in the autobiography 
The Discovery of India. After the defeat of India in the border war suddenly 
the Indian establishment or the policy making apparatus of Parliament got to 
the point of saying ‘This is totally wrong, you can’t have one man being the 
fountainhead of foreign policy. It’s a very complex issue’. So, then it still 
remained the prerogative of the Prime Minister’s Office but it was not a one 
man show in that sense; and it varied dependent on the competence of the 
Foreign Minister, we call it External Affairs Minister, and the interest of the 
Prime Minister in foreign policy making. That varied a great deal because 
there was a phase in 1990, for instance, we had a succession of Prime 
Ministers who were rather temporary. It was a political crisis which India was 
passing through. There were men like I. K. Gujral who became Prime Minister 
who was greatly interested in foreign policy making. For a time he was 
banished to Moscow during the Emergency because he was Information 
Minister at that time and Mrs Gandhi wanted a pliant person as Information 
Minister. So she sent him to Moscow as Indian ambassador. He was very 
keen on particularly in sub-continental affairs in terms of anything happening 
in Pakistan and in terms of what came to be called the Gujral Doctrine, which 
means you do more in terms of giving to your smaller neighbours than taking 
from them because of your size and so on and importance. 
 
SO: Sir, just to go back to that point of transition where foreign policy was 
very much the prerogative of the Indian Prime Minister under Nehru: 
following his death and the reconfiguration of the Commonwealth, 
where would you place the Indian Diplomatic Service in the formulation 
of foreign policy? I’ve been told by others that in fact in contrast to the 
country’s size, the Indian Foreign Service was relatively small and so it 
was under constraints of personnel: the talent pool was smaller, but the 
service also faced considerable bureaucratic requirements imposed 
upon it. 
 
SNS: That’s very true, very true. I think they recognised it and they tried to augment 
the size of the Indian Foreign Service, but it’s pitifully small considering the 
size of India and the relationship it has with different countries in the world. 
They are overworked and therefore the bureaucracy tends to neglect certain 
areas of foreign policy because you can’t do it, you can’t handle all there is to 
handle. I know, for instance, certain ambassadors in India have complained to 
me that they don’t get enough time with the Foreign Minister and so on. 
That’s not because of us snubbing some countries but it’s the physical 
impossibility of catering to hundreds, more than a hundred odd countries’ 
ambassadors. 
 
SO: Is there then a pattern of representation focusing on key posts which 
would tend to be political appointments? This would involve making 
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calculated political decisions, against budgetary restrictions, on where 
to focus Indian representation. During your time as a political 
correspondent, where were those political foci? 
 
SNS: Well, the political focuses are very obvious. One was the Soviet Union at that 
time, the other was China and the third was Pakistan because of our difficult 
relations with both our neighbours; and the fact that the Soviet Union was an 
important giver of arms. It sold arms that the West were not prepared to sell in 
those days, so it was an important relationship in that sense. But China was a 
difficult customer from the beginning more or less after the haze of India and 
China being ‘brothers dispersed’ - which was the initial phase you might 
recall. So, it was a difficult relationship which had to be managed and then 
you had Pakistan which because of the history was a very troublesome 
relationship. 
 
SO: In terms of India’s regional geopolitical calculations and the Soviet 
Union: this is the context of the Cold War. Yet in a desire to make sure 
that India was genuinely non-aligned rather than caught up in the 
contestation between blocs, the Soviet provision of hard weaponry 
would be attractive. In terms of regional contestation with Pakistan as 
two brothers who’d fallen out dramatically with the violence of Partition 
but also the ongoing Kashmir issue; you’ve also alluded to the border 
war and the tension between Beijing and Delhi. In all of this, in your 
particular view, did there continue to be any sense of a London-Delhi 
axis? 
 
SNS: Not really I’d say, no. No, I wouldn’t say so because the Cold War was a 
phenomenon which went on for quite some time. And the UK was very much 
tied up with the US of course and the Western Bloc, so to speak. India went 
to Moscow for materialistic reasons and because of the few other options it 
had. So, that lasted a considerable time and the fact that the United States 
had a treaty relationship with Pakistan in terms of armaments and everything 
else sucked Pakistan into a Cold War relationship because of its own reasons 
and Pakistan again for its own reasons. So, this complicated our relationship 
with Pakistan for obvious reasons. And which made us go to the Soviet Union 
more than we would otherwise have done. 
 
SO: Then how far can it be said that the Commonwealth in this highly 
charged ideological climate - in which India is determined not to be 
sucked into siding with one or other superpower bloc - does the 
Commonwealth, as a voluntary association for India in this period, 
enable multiple identities? I’m thinking of India with its leading role in 
the Non-Aligned Movement and the whole Bandung process; Pakistan 
became ideologically aligned with America; Britain and Canada were 
leading members of the Western Bloc through NATO. In other words, in 
terms of the Cold War and Non-Alignment, there were allies and 
fractured identities; but in the Commonwealth there was a sort of 
melting pot. 
 
SNS: Yes and to that extent it was useful because it was a forum where you could 
interact with people who otherwise you wouldn’t interact with at that level, so 




SO: For Nehru’s successors, then, you said that there was a reconfiguration 
of where foreign policy was formulated; that it was dispersed somewhat 
from the Prime Minister’s Office because it couldn’t be concentrated in 
one man. His successor, Nanda, was only in office for a very short time. 
Then Shastri, of course, served after 1964 until ’66.  How important was 
Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, in the formulation of Indian foreign 
policy? 
 
SNS: My impression was that she was not so greatly interested in foreign policy as 
such except to make a splash on the world stage in which she was interested. 
But she had a basic horse sense I would say, in terms of looking at foreign 
policy issues. Obviously she was influenced by her father and she was 
basically a pragmatic person in formulating foreign policy issues. I remember I 
talked to her on a background basis; this was before I left for Pakistan ‘cause 
this was in ’67 I think because I was the first representative of an Indian 
newspaper allowed to have a correspondent in Pakistan after the ’65 war 
because of The Statesman’s reputation. And I met her privately for a session 
on Pakistan and she was quite candid about the prospects of better relations 
with Pakistan. She was rather pessimistic about the likelihood of better 
relations. I brought up Kashmir for instance and she said, “What solution can 
there be on Kashmir considering the Pakistani attitudes?” [Laughs] 
 
SO: So, any resolution of this particular problem in her eyes lay entirely in 
Pakistan’s court. 
 
SNS: Well, because she felt, indeed she knew really that you couldn’t have a 
realistic solution on Pakistani terms and everybody knew that. That was her 
basic argument. 
 
SO: So, this was not a foreign policy issue; this was also a domestic issue 
of India. 
 
SNS: Yes, of course, very much so. 
 
SO: Intimately related. In your view then what was her style towards foreign 
policy? You say that she was very pragmatic; was she a woman who 
would use a very small coterie to advise her? Would she use particular 
sounding boards in the press? Was she particularly swayed by a 
particular power bloc within her party on foreign policy? I’m just trying 
to think about how the dynamics of Indian foreign policy worked at this 
particular period. 
 
SNS: Well, she had advisers. P. N. Haksar was a principal adviser and I think a 
great influence on her policy making because she had confidence in him and 
he was a bit of a leftist in ideological terms but all there. And I recall talking to 
him before writing, when I was doing my research on my book on Indo-Soviet 
relations called The Yogi and The Bear and I talked to him about the question 
of after the ’71 war, the Bangladesh War, and there was a great controversy 
in India about releasing 70,000 odd Pakistani prisoners. The general 
impression in India was that Indira Gandhi was conned because it was a lever 
which India decided to surrender, according to the popular view, without 
getting anything substantive in return, and especially on Kashmir which was a 
vague formulation by Bhutto which ultimately didn’t amount to anything. So, 
he was curious in a sense because he said, “Look, you have to trust people 
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or nations at a certain point and this was our gesture to Pakistan in terms of 
future relationships between the two countries”. To me, this was not a very 
convincing argument, but anyway that was his way of putting it. 
 
SO: How far did you see it at the time as a sop to Pakistan, because when 
India recognised Bangladesh this caused Ali Bhutto to withdraw 




SO: So, this was not simply diplomatic leverage. This was - if not a 
consolation prize -something of an alleviating factor as India was 
confronted with four million refugees and a humanitarian crisis on its 
Eastern Frontier. 
 
SNS: Yes, well obviously India’s interest was to get the people back to Bangladesh 
and one way of doing it was to recognise Bangladesh as a nation state and to 
speed up the process, because it was quite a difficult period for India in terms 
of catering to all these millions of people who descended on India. 
 
SO: Did you at this particular point meet Arnold Smith on his trips through 
the Indian subcontinent? 
 
SNS: I’m trying to recall whether I did. I think I did, because I seem to recall that I 
interviewed Arnold Smith for All India Radio. But that was so long ago! 
 
SO: Not to worry, sir! I just wondered because I’ve just been in Canada and 
have gone through his private papers in addition to reading his memoirs 
which he co-authored with Clyde Sanger called Stitches in Time. I was 
very struck by the extent to which the Commonwealth Secretary-
General - because of his view of the humanitarian disaster in India and 
on the question of Bangladesh recognition - seemed to be pressing the 
international community and Heads of Government into the pragmatism 
of recognition. Because then something could be done about the 
disaster on the ground. 
 
SNS: No, that certainly it was a factor in India’s recognition of Bangladesh which 
was coming anyway. It was a question of when rather than whether, but that 
was certainly a factor in India’s calculations. 
 
SO: You made a reference to All India Radio. Could I ask you also for your 
general view about the role of radio, the role of the BBC in helping to 
support a sense of a wider British world, a Commonwealth identity at 
this particular point? Or is this a completely false construct on my part? 
 
SNS: Well, I think BBC is highly respected in India as it is in many other countries, 
but I doubt if it played a great role in the kind of things you are suggesting. I 
doubt it. 
 
SO: I’m interested to hear you say that because I’ve interviewed someone 
from the BBC World who felt very strongly that it did play a role. I 
thought, I’m going to ask the same question of the other side to say, 




[SNS: Well, that’s my view. 
 
SO: And it’s a very valid one. After all it’s all a question of perspective, isn’t 
it; it depends where you’re standing. For India then in the 1970s having 
gone through traumatic events in the ‘60s with war with China, 
contestation with Pakistan, the creation of Bangladesh; how important 
did you feel foreign policy was in Indian politics in the early ‘70s after 
the seismic shift of the creation of Bangladesh in ’71? 
 
SNS: Well, it was certainly a climatic event also for Indian policy making. I think it 
projected probably a more prominent role in a certain way for India in terms of 
having created or helped create a new nation state kind of thing, despite the 
other problems involved with Pakistan and so on. So, I think it did play a role 
in terms of maybe broadening India’s horizons in terms of foreign policy 
making, yes. 
 
SO: In the 1970s then, the Commonwealth held its first Heads of 
Government meeting outside of the UK with the CHOGM held in 1971 in 
Singapore. As far as you recall, do these Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meetings start to acquire a greater importance in India’s 
diplomatic networking, in fostering particular contacts and lines of 
communication between Commonwealth Heads of Government as far as 
India is concerned? 
 
SNS: I think that’s the most useful aspect of the Commonwealth I would say that it’s 
a question of the background chats which people at that level have an 
opportunity of talking to each other and so on. So that’s the most useful 
aspect of it outside the regular agenda and so on, yes. 
 
SO: Because of course in 1971 Britain was in the dock, with the 
Conservative Government’s proposal for the resumed arms sales to 
South Africa. India at that particular point held a passionately held view 
on how inappropriate this was. India had long held views on the whole 
question of discrimination, which had developed into overt hostility to 
the apartheid state by the 1960s. 
 
SNS: Well, Britain has been from India’s point of view on the wrong side of the 
fence in not only in those times but also towards Southern Rhodesia at a later 
stage. When Margaret Thatcher was the Prime Minister because she was 
very chary of any real sanctions against Southern Rhodesia wasn’t she? 
 
SO: How much could it be said then that, for India, then the Commonwealth 
became in the 1970s and the 1980s the means by which to pressure 
Britain on the question of white minority governments in southern 
Africa? 
 
SNS: Well, certainly I think India used it, as other countries from the developing 
world, in terms of pressuring Britain. 
 
SO: You mentioned Mrs Thatcher. What was the relationship, do you know, 




SNS: Well, strangely a very good one despite their ideological differences because 
I think both were hard headed pragmatists and they got along very well 
apparently despite whatever the differences were. 
 
SO: You sound rather puzzled by that! [Laughs] 
 
SNS: Well, it was curious in a way [laughs] because Margaret Thatcher was 
Margaret Thatcher; we all knew her attitudes to … 
 
SO: Yes, but in a way they were both ladies of a similar vintage. Both had 
been to Oxford, to Somerville, so there’s a degree of shared 
experiences. 
 
SNS: Yes, although she hardly. 
 








SO: … authoritative women who also had a very clear conceptualisation of 
their input into foreign policy although for Mrs Thatcher she certainly 
grew into that particular role. Now, I’m just struck by that because other 
female politicians have been quite critical of Mrs Thatcher and yet you 
say that in fact that there was a paradox here of her good working 
relationship with Mrs Gandhi. 
 
SNS: Oh yes. 
 
SO: Yes.  Did you witness that then at the 1983 Delhi CHOGM; were you 
close on reporting on that? 
 
SNS: Well, actually I was based in the United States at that time doing a book but I 
came for the CHOGM to Delhi on a visit and of course there was great drama 
with Fidel Castro I recall, especially him embracing Mrs Gandhi on the stage 
and that kind of populous gesture. Yes, I think people recognised that Mrs 
Gandhi’s relationship was very good. 
 
SO: Hmm, but it was more on a Heads of Government basis, rather than 
giving any particular role of importance as a diplomatic actor to the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SNS: Yes.  Yes, I would think so. 
 
SO: The interesting thing of course by that point is that one of the key 
members of Mrs Gandhi’s private office, Moni Malhoutra, had come to 
London and was working in the Commonwealth Secretariat here. I’m 
particularly struck by your statement of the role of the Prime Minister’s 
Office and then for a key member of her team to come here indicates a 
particular validation of the Secretariat in its diplomacy and brokering 






SO: Do you have any recollections of that CHOGM meeting of 1983? I know 
that Sir Sonny Ramphal thought that after the settlement of the 
Rhodesia question in 1980 that 1983 was going to be rather a dull 
CHOGM and then of course immediately preceding that Heads of 
Government meeting the Americans had invaded Grenada, with Ronald 
Reagan completely forgetting that perhaps he might have violated 




SO: Not something I’m sure that his advisers were aware of in any way, 
shape or form! 
 
SNS: But I think I’m mixing up the Non-Aligned with the Commonwealth. Yes, 
because Fidel doesn’t fit into the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: He doesn’t although he made visits to Marlborough House. At one point 
he did make a suggestion that perhaps Cuba could join the 
Commonwealth. I don’t think it was an altogether serious suggestion! 
Secretary General Chief Anyaoku also made a historic visit to Cuba, so 
that there were certainly diplomatic lines of communication there. In this 
period then the Non-Aligned Movement is really India’s preferred forum 
of action that you saw? 
 
SNS: I think there has been, over the decades, a historical change in India’s 
approach to Non-Alignment. There was a feeling in India that Non-Alignment, 
which was a valid concept when it was started, for some considerable time, 
that it was a bit hijacked by the radicals shall we say. In later years I think 
India valued Non-Alignment less and less in terms of foreign policy making. 
 
SO: Yes.  Were you back in India when Mrs Gandhi was assassinated? 
  
SNS: No, I was in Paris. I was doing a book on UNESCO. 
 
SO: Yes. As far as you observed, what was the role of her successors and 
their contribution towards Indian foreign policy? 
 




SNS: Well, not a great deal I would imagine. 
 
SO: She was succeeded by Rajiv Gandhi in 1984. 
 
SNS: Well, Rajiv had more than his hands full in domestic politics but Rajiv had a 
concept of perhaps vague but perhaps idealistic, but a concept of nuclear 
disarmament. He was quite serious about it. Of course nothing much came of 




SO: Why? Because of institutional resistance within the scientific 
community and the political community in India, having achieved 
nuclear capability in ’74? 
 
SNS: Neither of the big nuclear powers was going to dismantle them. So it was an 
idealistic concept, but my view is that perhaps he believed too much in the 
concept of a nuclear war which again was quite idealistic, to say the least. 
 
SO: So, for those forces within India that contribute to the formulation of 
policy, and which helped to shape it as well as form it, having acquired 
nuclear capability there was absolutely no way, in the context of the 
Cold War and in the context of regional geopolitics, that India was going 
to surrender this advantage? 
 
SNS: No, of course not. Nobody thought about it. 
 
SO: Do you remember thinking that having acquired this ultimate weapon of 
mass destruction and that indicator of being at the top table, after all the 
great power status that comes with nuclear capability, that this had 
contributed to regional destabilisation? 
 
SNS: Well, I don’t know because after all Pakistan acquired one too. 
 
SO: But after India. 
 
SNS: After India, of course, after India, but the fact is that it was neutralised, India 
was neutralised in that sense, like the Russians acquired it after the 
Americans and so on so it’s a usual chain cycle. 
 
SO: But in the politics of informed discussion among those who followed 
foreign policy and practice closely, there wasn’t a sense of this had 
initiated a regional arms race? 
 
SNS: Not inordinately I think, no. 
 
SO: So, by the 1980s, did India in any way value the Commonwealth as a 
diplomatic actor? The Commonwealth through the Secretary-General 
had contributed to the resolution of the Rhodesia Zimbabwe issue in 
1980 and the Commonwealth was certainly pressing Britain particularly 
and Mrs Thatcher on the question of policy towards South Africa. 
 
SNS: Well, I think India felt that it was a useful instrument but I think after that 
phase there was considerable downgrading at least in psychological terms of 
the Commonwealth as far as India was concerned. 
 
SO: Do you mean after the final transition to black majority rule in South 
Africa? 
 
SNS: After South Africa which was, I think, the height of the Commonwealth’s 
efficacy and then it seemed that the Commonwealth was not so important 
after all in policy terms. 
 
SO: You’ve mentioned Rajiv Gandhi’s own particular idealism and his 
continued importance in Indian foreign policy, by virtue of the authority 
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of his office; and contribution to the Commonwealth. Were there ever 
any other impulses from within the Indian political machine using the 
Commonwealth as a way to achieve Indian foreign policy goals, in the 
1980s? 
 
SNS: My impression is that not in any great sense, no. 
 
SO: By the 1990s then, you mentioned successful transition to 
independence and black majority rule in South Africa between 1990 and 
’94. This also coincided with the end of the Cold War and the break-up 
of the Soviet Union, which was a fundamental reconfiguration of 
international relations. You’re saying at this particular time India really 
moved further away from thinking the Commonwealth was a useful 
vehicle? 
 
SNS: I would imagine so, yes. 
 
SO: This was just at the time when, with the change of leadership of the 
Secretary-General, Chief Emeka was now emphasising the 
Commonwealth’s role as a voluntary association to foster democracy 
and human rights. 
 
SNS: Yes, but as you know very well that all the great declarations that have been 
made by Commonwealth meetings, Heads of Government meetings are 
legion and the net result of all those declarations has been rather poor I think, 
in terms of all the norms that have been postulated and set up and so on. So 
it’s not a very glorious record in that sense. 
 
SO: Indeed, no. So, then why do you feel it is that India hasn’t made more of 
the Commonwealth? Is it because they don’t see it as a useful tool in 
terms of successive Indian leaders although India’s expertise in 
contributing to the Commonwealth networks, the filigree of 
relationships that exist, its contribution in terms of knowledge, its 
linkages through other Commonwealth NGOs, informal organisations, is 
really very strongly present. It seems to be there is a dichotomy 
between the lack of political affirmation of the value and usage of the 
Commonwealth… 
 
SNS: Yes, there is. 
 
SO: … and India’s individual contributions to the continued workings of the 
Commonwealth. Is that fair to say? 
 
SNS: I think up to a point, yes. 
 
SO: Yes. So, you don’t see that as paradoxical? 
 
SNS: Well, it’s only paradox is the world that is. 
 
SO: Yes. As far as Indian civil society or Indian politics is concerned, does 





SNS: As far as the politicians in India are concerned, I would say no, that they don’t 
regard the Commonwealth as useful for their purposes in terms of 
relationships especially like sub-continental relationships. 
 
SO: Yes. Would there be any possibility of an Indian leader seeking to use 
the good officers of the Commonwealth Secretary-General to foster an 
improvement of India-Pakistan relations on the Kashmir issue? 
 
SNS: I would doubt it, for the simple reason that India’s attitude which is there is no-
one else that, this is something we have to sort out among ourselves and the 
nearest we got to that stage was during General Musharraf’s time. When he 
proposed a set of proposals which were much more realistic than any 
proposal by Pakistan until that time. So, India would be very, very hesitant to 
seek outside good officers of the Commonwealth or anybody else in terms of 
solving the Kashmir issue, which the Americans for instance recognised some 
years ago. 
 
SO: Yes, indeed. Is it because of a particular sensitivity to domestic politics 
on this issue? As you say, General Musharraf had made a potentially 




SO: So, then the weight of resistance comes from within Indian politics 
rather than Indian decision making? 
 
SNS: Well, there’s a great deal of resistance, yes, in Indian politics on that because 
it’s a very sensitive issue; but if there were a realistic proposal basically which 
is that you have some swaps but the line of control is the final boundary, that 
would be possible to sell. 
 
SO: In terms of other regional and geopolitical challenges: India’s particular 
position on the Sri Lankan Civil War. Was that an aspect that you 




SO: Again, the potential for an inter-mestic issue, - an international issue 
that has domestic ramifications. Was India again determined to pursue a 
bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka rather than to use the 
Commonwealth as a vehicle to… 
 
SNS: Well, the Indo-Sri Lankan problem is a very complex model from India’s point 
of view because you have the state of Tamil Nadu which takes a rather 
extreme view in terms of the Tamils, Sri Lankan Tamils and their welfare and 
so on; and you have a rather authoritarian government in Sri Lanka, 
especially with the present dispensation of Premadasa and his brothers who 
were running the show. So, it is a question of the importance of Sri Lanka-
India relations, as opposed to the regional compulsions that come into play in 
Tamil Nadu. It’s a difficult balancing act for India, for New Delhi to proceed 
further really. 
 
SO: Was this issue closely and carefully covered in the Indian press since 




SNS: Yes, of course, but the final act which is still a subject of inquiry and of course 
Sri Lankans don’t want a real inquiry into it and the new authoritarian trends 
that are so prevalent in Sri Lanka. You can’t get very far on this issue whether 
in the Commonwealth or outside it. 
 
SO: So, in terms then of the value of the Commonwealth as a diplomatic 
actor, although the Commonwealth Secretariat here in London provides 
the diplomatic machine for the Secretary-General, this really doesn’t 
feature then, certainly in your particular consciousness? That it remains 
a sub-actor in a global sub- system which doesn’t necessarily serve 
India’s regional and great power agenda. 
 
SNS: I think it would be fair to say that, yes. 
 
SO: Yes. What’s your view of the contribution of the Commonwealth then 
over your long involvement in journalism, surveying Indian politics in 
the international scene? 
 
SNS: Well, there again as I’ve suggested that is the Nehru phase which was very 
important in terms of his own links to Britain and his being influenced by 
British thoughts and so on and the fact that he had a sentimental attachment 
to Britain and the Commonwealth in a sense. That was no longer the case 
after him really and so it was a much more functional kind of relationship. 
 
SO: So, the current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh similarly uses the 




SO: As far as you’ve observed, there’s no particular agenda and strategy of 
using the Commonwealth Finance Minister’s meetings in the run up 
before the World Bank, or other Commonwealth organisational 
conventions and conjunction points specifically to fulfil a strategy? 
 
SNS: I think that would be fair to say that, yes, because there are so many other 
avenues which are considered more important in terms of influencing policy. 
 
SO: The interesting thing of course is that since 2008 there has been an 
Indian Secretary-General; does this feature at all in the awareness of 
Indian politics? 
 
SNS: Very little and unfortunately his record has not been brilliant, has it? He is in 
fact more a diplomat than necessary, I think; that’s the general view. 
 
SO: All nations’ conduct of their diplomacy certainly have particular 
characteristics. I’m just wondering if the particular culture of Indian 
diplomacy is indeed to be discreet but also ‘discuss and delay’? In other 
words, to foster a degree of procrastination in the belief that points of 
tension will inevitably work themselves out, so you don’t want to hurry 
into it. 
 




SO: Right. So, if somebody is a consummate diplomat from that particular 
culture, then by virtue of their very background, they are going to bring 
that particular national culture to the way that they conduct their office. 
 
SNS: Yes, because if you take a man like McKinnon and his kind of memoir and his 
blunt statements about the Commonwealth countries, about particular people 
and so on, and even Arnold Smith the first Secretary-General who was quite 
forthright; they were both quite forthright. I think it was McKinnon who said 
that India considered Commonwealth a ‘B Team’ which is true. So, for 
instance I think there is this problem of whether the Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth could have done more in relation to recent events in Sri 
Lanka, especially the impeachment of the Chief Justice, which is terrible I 
think. 
 
SO: Is there an undercurrent of that view in India itself? Obviously that 
certainly is a very firmly held view in other quarters, but I’m just 
wondering within the Indian political context? 
 
SNS: Well, perhaps not to that extent because India’s expectations are rather low 
as far as the Commonwealth is concerned. 
 
SO: I’m going to suggest this to you and I welcome your comments – was 
there a desire or a political wish to have an Indian diplomat as Secretary 
General, a very established diplomat in a prestigious post in London, 
but that this should not be a complicating factor for India’s own foreign 
policy? So, you don’t appoint one of your own who then will provide a 
destabilising and potentially argumentative point, because the role of 
the Secretary-General is to coordinate opinion but also to have some 
autonomy of action within the Commonwealth. 
 
SNS: Yes. I don’t think there was much fear as far as India is concerned about that, 
perhaps because they knew their man [laughs]. 
 
SO: Indeed. So, it could be said that Indian foreign policy is ideally served 
by the particular approach of the current Secretary-General. 
 
SNS: Perhaps, yes. 
 
SO: Well, you certainly don’t want to put ‘a turbulent priest’ into a position of 
authority that immeasurably complicates what you’re trying to achieve! 
[Laughs] On India’s style of diplomacy; is it very much to be ‘below the 
radar’, to have a quiet word, to establish through patient negotiation, 
consensus and discussion so again not just diplomatic processes and 
cultures, but also styles that also come into play? 
 
SNS: Well, I think Indian diplomats do tend to be cautious for the simple reason that 
if you have your head above the parapet you always face difficulties, so to 
that extent, yes. 
 
SO: Yes. Is Indian foreign policy a hotly debated issue in India’s Parliament? 
 
SNS: In relation to certain countries, yes. China, Pakistan, the Soviet Union in the 
old days, now Russia, and neighbours, particularly apart from Pakistan you 
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have Sri Lanka and Nepal, which again are somewhat worrisome neighbours 
in other terms, not in terms of India-Pakistani relations. 
 
SO: Of course other enormous points of friction in the region, in India’s 
backyard, have been the Maldives. I’m just wondering if you were aware 
of India using the channel of the Secretariat, or the channel of the 
Commonwealth in any way to achieve a desirable outcome, as far as 
India, was concerned in the Maldives? 
 
SNS: Not to my knowledge. 
 
SO: And the other issues are Burma and Bangladesh. I asked you about the 
question of Pakistan and of course there’s the northern neighbour on 
the other side of the Himalayas which has been a perennial geopolitical 
challenge to India since 1949. On Burma and Bangladesh: are these 
particularly contentious aspects in Indian politics or do they tend not to 
be? 
 
SNS: Well, Burma is a rather non-controversial aspect of Indian foreign policy 
because there is not much dispute about what India should do in relation to 
Burma. As far as Bangladesh is concerned it is guided by domestic politics as 
well, especially in West Bengal which is one aspect of it; and you will recall 
the last Prime Ministerial visit to Bangladesh there is this Teesta dispute over 
the Teesta River problem and India had more or less wrapped up an 
agreement and that was vetoed by the West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata 
Banerjee. So there are domestic constraints on foreign policy in terms of a 
country like both Bangladesh and Nepal as well as Sri Lanka for different 
reasons. 
 
SO: Sir, over your long professional life then, from your viewpoint what has 
been the contribution of the Commonwealth to international politics and 
to international relations? 
 
SNS: Well, I think initially it was a good influence as far as India was concerned, the 
Commonwealth concept and it was a ‘coming-out’ party for India especially 
after independence. It was a forum where you rubbed shoulders with the high 
and mighty of the world. But there again over the years it diminished, the role 
certainly diminished. 
 
SO: So, does it lend itself to Stalin’s sneering comment ‘how many divisions 




SO: I’m very struck by the extent to which within the Commonwealth as a 
voluntary association which has evolved since ’65, there has been a 
continuum of support for African democratisation; this obviously 
involves issues of racial justice, but also issues of human rights, 
economic rights, political rights. But there isn’t the same narrative in the 






SO: I’m also struck by the efficacy of the Commonwealth as a diplomatic 
agency in the context of Africa and there doesn’t appear to have been a 
similar Commonwealth agency in Asian subcontinent. Is that because 
India regarded itself very much as the regional hegemon? Is this great 
power politics and conceptualisation – as India didn’t need the 
Commonwealth - whereas there was an identification with and a 
usefulness of the Commonwealth among newly independent African 
nations achieving racial justice, which of course was indelibly tied up 
with their own political legitimacy at home. Yet India didn’t have that 
same need for political legitimacy. 
 
SNS: I would tend to agree with you, yes, because, well, India’s needs were very 
different and I think there are two peaks of the Commonwealth with South 
Africa and the laws, among the laws was the UK’s entry into the European 
Economic Community at that time which, there were two major events with 
very different ways that influenced India. 
SO: What were your particular views about England’s entry into the 
European Economic Community then in ’73? 
 
SNS: Well, personally I think Britain had no choice and still has no choice, but that 
is my view, that it belongs to Europe. We live in a different age, a postcolonial 
world and your place obviously, though you’re an island, your place is 
obviously in Europe. It’s very simple in so many ways, geographical terms 
and everything. 
 
SO: Well, we like to think that we’re a world power of the second rank, rather 
than a small and insignificant little nation off the coast of Europe. 
[Laughs] We have problems with identity and identities too, I think. 
 
SNS: Yes, of course and, well, hence the attraction of the Commonwealth to certain 
sections of the people here in any case. 
 
SO: Yes, which was the question I was trying to draw out Dr Kwarteng on 
yesterday, this whole question of legacies of empire. How much are 
there insidious legacies that preoccupied British politics, and 
Conservative political cultures still to conceptualise Britain at the heart 
of a global trading system - which after all was an indelible part of 
empire and reinforced through imperial preference. You’ve also got 
patterns of communities. 
 
But if I could address those two points then: Britain’s entry into the EEC 
in the 1970s and this question of India and its diaspora. Were you part 
of the intense political reportage on the negotiations of entry and 
discussions about how appropriate this was, and the impact that this 
would have on India and the Commonwealth? 
 
SNS: Well, there’s certainly a lot of discussion on the consequences of Britain’s 
entry into the European Community yes, and I think the measure of 
satisfaction, if I may say so, that De Gaulle he told it in the first instance! 
[Laughs] 
 
SO: Ooh!  Was that a sense of Britain’s got its comeuppance; it can’t get 






SNS: But yes, certainly there was a discussion. As far as Indian diaspora, is 
concerned it’s a totally different feel in a sense. 
 
SO: No that I appreciate, but for India, Britain going into the EEC: was that 
yet another step away from the Commonwealth as a wider British 
world? 
 
SNS: I would think so, yes. 
 
SO: That there was different subcultural understanding of entry into the 




SO: Did you see it as an important rupture, or was it just yet another 
diminution? 
 
SNS: The latter I think, yes. No, there was no rupture as such. 
 
SO: The Commonwealth was of course itself was going through yet another 
transformation in the 1970s and early ‘80s with the emergence of those 
small states that you spoke of. So Commonwealth enlargement was 
taking place just at a time when the benefits of any close relationship 
with Britain on a bilateral basis it could be said, were being diluted in 
terms of commercial relationships or financial relationships. So, part 
and parcel of a fundamental reconfiguring of the Commonwealth and 
ideas of what the Commonwealth was? 
 
On the Indian diaspora: I’m puzzled why India hasn’t used the 
Commonwealth more, just looking at patterns of Indian migration 
across the globe and the extent to which there are considerable 
concentrations of settlement in Commonwealth member countries. 
 
SNS: Well, I think the general attitude in India is that Indians will go anywhere 
where there is an opportunity, Commonwealth or no Commonwealth. I don’t 
think it’s related to Commonwealth the fact that there is a major presence. 
 
SO: Well, there is a sizeable Indian community in the States. But for Indians 
themselves, does the Commonwealth provide a validating identity? For 
the Canadians, given how many different identities there are within that 
territorial space, the Commonwealth provides a validation against the 
United States; it allows for multiple identities for the Canadian nation. 
Does the Commonwealth in any way do the same for India which after 
all is highly diverse? 
 
SNS: No, not really, because my impression of the Canadians is - I’ve lived in the 
United States but not in Canada - that they don’t know their identity, they are 
seeking identity. They are not quite sure what they are between the French 










SO: But so does India. 
 
SNS: Well yes, but in a different sense. I don’t think that there is any problem with 
Indian-ness unlike for Canadians. We are not searching for an identity, no. 
 
SO: No, you’re very confident and, as you say proud of your very, very long 
history and identity and your economic growth, your technological 
advancements, your great power capacity and your democratic 
institutions. 
 
SNS: Yes, despite all the flaws. 
 




SO: Mr Singh, is there anything else you feel I should ask you about India 
and the Commonwealth? 
 




SNS: Essentially what it will turn out to be. 
 
SO: What about the Queen; how much has she been an indelible part of 
holding the Commonwealth together in your view? 
 
SNS: Well, she is as everybody knows a symbolic head and there is a certain 
amount of speculation about after her what happens, but I don’t think there is 
any quarrel about that, her being a symbol. Of course a number of countries, 
especially the old Commonwealth, they regard her as their Head of State, 
unlike most of the members of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: How is she regarded in India? I know India is a republic but I’m just 
wondering how the institution… 
 
SNS: Oh I think she is regarded well in India. India had legions of kings and queens 
so it can live with multiple identities in that sense. She is regarded well I think, 
doing her job or trying to do it as best she can, and of course there is a 
dispute about her not going to Sri Lanka, whether it is a diplomatic way of 
downgrading or punishing Sri Lanka for its policies. 
 
SO: It’s certainly to her advantage that the Palace have reviewed her long 
haul travel plans as someone who is 87. There are interesting 
constitutional questions on Prince Charles attending: it could be said 
that she has deputised her son, but he is not the automatic next Head of 
the Commonwealth even if he is the heir to the British throne, and 
therefore the heir to the throne for a number of Commonwealth 
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countries, but the majority of course are republics. So, there’s an 
interesting quirk there. What do you think on the likelihood of the 
Commonwealth surviving? 
 
SNS: Well, I think it’ll survive because, for lack of inertia. Once you have… 
 
SO: Other people have commented on this question of inertia! [Laughs] 
 
SNS: Well, it’s a question of dismantling something is a very difficult operation and 
requires a large amount of willpower and that is difficult to gather at the best 
of times. 
 
SO: I think the critics of Britain’s membership of the European Union haven’t 





SO: So, you feel that the weight of habit… 
 
SNS: Well, it will become less and less relevant perhaps. 
 
SO: Well, international politics and the international community has 
changed so dramatically in the last 60 years. The Commonwealth could 
be said to have been a pilot fish ahead of its time in instituting regular 
summit meetings. Now its Heads of Government meetings are now 
much shorter rather than the original extended types of meeting, and if 
you’ve got different patterns of international organisation these take up 




SO: So, is there a continued need for the formal arrangements of the 
Commonwealth? As you say, the smaller Heads of State do need it, 
whereas Britain doesn’t need the Commonwealth to phone up the 
President of South Africa. I wonder the extent to which that the 
Commonwealth is fated to go through cycles of decline but also 
improvement as it has done since 1949. Different parts of the 
Commonwealth, the informal organisations, are doing extraordinarily 
well because international politics is changing, with the rise of civil 
society actors and non-governmental organisations. So, you’ve got 
different impulses into diplomacy. 
 
SNS: Well, basically the non-governmental organisations are doing good work and 
that’s a plus factor and of course especially for the smaller countries it’s a 
very important institution because that’s their ladder to the bigger folk in terms 
of interacting and so on. 
 
SO: So, then taking that to the next extension, the Commonwealth was 
ideally suited into a relatively small world of shifting power relations 
that relied particularly on personal diplomacy and contacts between 
Heads of State? With then a reconfiguration of international politics, and 
a decreasing policy space for leadership initiative, the possibility of 
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leaders actually initiating policy, I would think are more constrained 
now than they were, say, in the 1970s. 
 
SNS: Yes. Yes, and of course you also have to consider the fact that most of the 
developed countries in the Commonwealth are the more substantial aid 
providers for, especially NGOs and other activities. 
 
SO: In your view, just talking about the future of the Commonwealth, how far 
do you feel that China might represent a challenge to the 
Commonwealth as a values based organisation? The very fact that 
China offers alternative lines of funding and weaponry undercuts 
Commonwealth attempts to be a seductive club to say, “Please improve 
your human rights record and your political record, independence of 
your judiciary, the freedom of your press and do please release political 
detainees.” 
 
SNS: To a certain extent but there again it’s a loaded question. As far as the 
Chinese help is concerned you have to balance the money you’re getting with 
the other obligations, spoken or unspoken, that might be required of you. So, I 
would imagine that the Commonwealth is more attractive in terms of smaller 
countries accepting aid because there are no strings like there would be in 
relation to Chinese aid for instance. 
 
SO: Sir Ron Sanders has written very cogently on the growing financial 
investment and strategic positioning of China in Fiji and the extent to 
which that there is a contestation with the United States, and the 
implications this then have as a brake on the necessity of 
democratisation for the Fijian government. He has said the same 
process seems to be at play in Sri Lanka, providing alternative finance 
and alternative infrastructure development. 
 
SNS: But there again for instance Sri Lanka you have to consider the risks involved 
in relation not only to domestic politics but in relation to their, Sri Lanka’s 
relations with India, because that is a factor which they have to take into 
account. 
 
SO: Yes. Well, it’s certainly true is that there is a continued reconfiguration 
of international relations. Whether the Commonwealth as a useful global 
subsystem will have a validity and an attraction outside small states, 




SO: Sir, thank you very much indeed. 
 
SNS: Well, not at all. 
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
